The texts this week, Fritzsche's final pages and "The Hitler Myth," were quite complimentary. While Fritzsche addresses two popular misconceptions about Hitler's rise, Versailles and the Depression, Ian Kershaw addresses the misconceptions that the Fuhrer and his ministers put forth by design. Kershaw's attention to the myth that generated appeal goes well with Fritzsche's explanation of voter appeal. Their arguments facilitate an assessment of the Third Reich as a populist movement that evolved into a cult of personality.
The parades of January 30, 1933 that left reporters and even Goebbels himself awe-struck indicate the popular deification already at work. The torch procession, especially as described by the onlooking French ambassador, forbodingly evokes imagery more akin to a black mass than a political triumph. Hitler used tactics that find their roots in the Hindenburg elections of 1925 to gain such sweeping mobilization. Here, the right learned how to get fired up- i.e. paramilitary organizations, meetings, youth alliances, and rallies- but they would fail to find umbrella representation until the Nazi alternative. After this ground-up movement made its mark on the Reichstagh, a top-down initiative would be necessary.
This meant a deified Hitler. In an actualization of Hobbe's Leviathan, the troubles of the Weimar Republic seemed to leave a general craving for stern, single-minded leadership. The portrait of Hitler was infallible: a selfless personification of national unity, an economic miracle-worker, the fair yet ruthless bringer of justice at home and abroad, a moderate/traditionalist, and a military genius all wrapped into one. This ideal was the people's and the party's, and alienated who it could easily afford to- elites and political enemies (not to mention those condemned citizenry).
What strikes me most about the Hitler myth hearkens back to my Catch-22 blog post, wherein the unifying power of hatred was pondered. Fritzsche is convincing in his assessment that the Nazis won power, not through hate and fear-mongering, but domestic promise. Once in, however, could Hitler have forged such strong bonds among the German populace without condemning social impurities, without the rhetoric of racial inferiorty? The Nazis were seen as bringing a better way of life to the largest amount of Germans, and did. But the nation was so divided that only the harshest commonalities would suffice, human sacrifice among them.
Kershaw also reminds me of my thoughts of the structure of myth itself as a historiographical accomplice. Hitler's "underlings" knew the key to the popular heart was this God image, a guise which ultimately revealed (take your pick)- Shiva, Satan, Lord Voldemort...
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To answer your question, I would argue that Hitler's early popularity was based less on the racial beliefs than on the new sense of inclusiveness and the foreign policy successes that 'redeemed' the shame of Versailles. However, part of theeconomic recovery was tied to exclusion of Jews from the economy, thus creating new jobs for 'Aryans' but also on the rearmament process that also depended on a lesser view of other nations/ races.
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