The texts this week, Fritzsche's final pages and "The Hitler Myth," were quite complimentary. While Fritzsche addresses two popular misconceptions about Hitler's rise, Versailles and the Depression, Ian Kershaw addresses the misconceptions that the Fuhrer and his ministers put forth by design. Kershaw's attention to the myth that generated appeal goes well with Fritzsche's explanation of voter appeal. Their arguments facilitate an assessment of the Third Reich as a populist movement that evolved into a cult of personality.
The parades of January 30, 1933 that left reporters and even Goebbels himself awe-struck indicate the popular deification already at work. The torch procession, especially as described by the onlooking French ambassador, forbodingly evokes imagery more akin to a black mass than a political triumph. Hitler used tactics that find their roots in the Hindenburg elections of 1925 to gain such sweeping mobilization. Here, the right learned how to get fired up- i.e. paramilitary organizations, meetings, youth alliances, and rallies- but they would fail to find umbrella representation until the Nazi alternative. After this ground-up movement made its mark on the Reichstagh, a top-down initiative would be necessary.
This meant a deified Hitler. In an actualization of Hobbe's Leviathan, the troubles of the Weimar Republic seemed to leave a general craving for stern, single-minded leadership. The portrait of Hitler was infallible: a selfless personification of national unity, an economic miracle-worker, the fair yet ruthless bringer of justice at home and abroad, a moderate/traditionalist, and a military genius all wrapped into one. This ideal was the people's and the party's, and alienated who it could easily afford to- elites and political enemies (not to mention those condemned citizenry).
What strikes me most about the Hitler myth hearkens back to my Catch-22 blog post, wherein the unifying power of hatred was pondered. Fritzsche is convincing in his assessment that the Nazis won power, not through hate and fear-mongering, but domestic promise. Once in, however, could Hitler have forged such strong bonds among the German populace without condemning social impurities, without the rhetoric of racial inferiorty? The Nazis were seen as bringing a better way of life to the largest amount of Germans, and did. But the nation was so divided that only the harshest commonalities would suffice, human sacrifice among them.
Kershaw also reminds me of my thoughts of the structure of myth itself as a historiographical accomplice. Hitler's "underlings" knew the key to the popular heart was this God image, a guise which ultimately revealed (take your pick)- Shiva, Satan, Lord Voldemort...
Friday, October 23, 2009
Friday, October 9, 2009
Free To Be Nazis
Broadly, Peter Fritzsche's argument in Germans Into Nazis is that Hitler's regime was brought about by a process of democratization. The August Days of 1914 and the revolution in 1918 are presented as the key turning points before 1933. The evidence is solid, but this does not make Fritzsche's argument any less counter-intuitive. Nazis epitomize fascism, and fascism is associated with a power seizure from above. Germans Into Nazis makes what turns out to be a bold claim, as the title all but suggests- Germans weren't brainwashed into accepting the Third Reich, they transformed themselves.
Fritzche's argument has historical precedent outside of Germany. The Nazis themselves only occurred once, but people seizing government control (again- democratization) has led to authoritarian (in this case totalitarian) regimes pretty often. One sees this in many different forms: Napolean is to the French Revolution as Stalin is to the Russian Revolution as Mao is to the Chinese Revolution. Furthermore, democracies in Italy, Brazil, and India all fell to tyranny in the 20th century. So Weimar Germany provided the perfect conditions for Hitler to exercise power, a mere addendum to a pre-existing precedent.
The danger in suggesting such a broad historical trend is the multiplicity of counter-examples. But how many are there? Populist movements have certainly been known to lead to functional democracies, but these begin to look like more of an exception than a rule. The American Revolution certainly never ushered in a totalitarian order. Denmark and Switzerland also boast long traditions of democratic stability. Am I missing any? Aincient Greece, perhaps? Modern Greece certainly belongs in the second paragraph- for the overthrow of democracy once in 1936 and again with the military coup of 1967.
Crucial to the rise of Nazism is Germany's unique militarism. Fritzsche identifies two very different entities: the interest group society of the Weimar republic and the Freikorps. The two can be reconciled to explain the rise of Nazism. Germany has always struggled with disunity (see last week's post), divisions that reach to its HRE days. Unity has always come in a militant guise- be it unification itself or the grand August Days of 1914 (where Fritzsche sees the origins of German populism and Nazism). Intoxicating as this unity seems to have been, the rapture of the August Days were short-lived, to be replaced by a bitter commonality that ran the Kaiser out. Then, it was back to fracture as always with the self-interested vocational splits that dominated Weimar. The Freikorps was an outlet for veterans and militants in general, many members would become prominent Nazis later on. However, they were nihilistic in many ways, not having any political motivation.
The fracture of the interest groups was nationalistically unsatisfying. The Freikorps- simply a blind, violent embodiment of a yearning for national singularity. In such a state, the Germans were ripe for a movement that captured the ideals of the Left and the blind nationalism of the Right, all the while basking in the promise of great military glory. As Nazis, the intoxication of the crowd could be felt once more...
Fritzche's argument has historical precedent outside of Germany. The Nazis themselves only occurred once, but people seizing government control (again- democratization) has led to authoritarian (in this case totalitarian) regimes pretty often. One sees this in many different forms: Napolean is to the French Revolution as Stalin is to the Russian Revolution as Mao is to the Chinese Revolution. Furthermore, democracies in Italy, Brazil, and India all fell to tyranny in the 20th century. So Weimar Germany provided the perfect conditions for Hitler to exercise power, a mere addendum to a pre-existing precedent.
The danger in suggesting such a broad historical trend is the multiplicity of counter-examples. But how many are there? Populist movements have certainly been known to lead to functional democracies, but these begin to look like more of an exception than a rule. The American Revolution certainly never ushered in a totalitarian order. Denmark and Switzerland also boast long traditions of democratic stability. Am I missing any? Aincient Greece, perhaps? Modern Greece certainly belongs in the second paragraph- for the overthrow of democracy once in 1936 and again with the military coup of 1967.
Crucial to the rise of Nazism is Germany's unique militarism. Fritzsche identifies two very different entities: the interest group society of the Weimar republic and the Freikorps. The two can be reconciled to explain the rise of Nazism. Germany has always struggled with disunity (see last week's post), divisions that reach to its HRE days. Unity has always come in a militant guise- be it unification itself or the grand August Days of 1914 (where Fritzsche sees the origins of German populism and Nazism). Intoxicating as this unity seems to have been, the rapture of the August Days were short-lived, to be replaced by a bitter commonality that ran the Kaiser out. Then, it was back to fracture as always with the self-interested vocational splits that dominated Weimar. The Freikorps was an outlet for veterans and militants in general, many members would become prominent Nazis later on. However, they were nihilistic in many ways, not having any political motivation.
The fracture of the interest groups was nationalistically unsatisfying. The Freikorps- simply a blind, violent embodiment of a yearning for national singularity. In such a state, the Germans were ripe for a movement that captured the ideals of the Left and the blind nationalism of the Right, all the while basking in the promise of great military glory. As Nazis, the intoxication of the crowd could be felt once more...
Sunday, October 4, 2009
Blame War on Disunity
On Friday, Malto posed the question- who do you blame for World War I? This is the type of inquiry history professors make because it is necessary and thought-provoking for students, while knowing no definitive answer exists even among countless historians. We were posed this question from a national standpoint in my AP 20th century course. It's a fine place to start (should we blame the Serbs? Austrians? Russians? Germans?) but there is a great fallacy in thinking of countries as single, acting units. After the semester's examination so far, I think Germany is the best example of such fracture and disunity, to the extent that blaming Germany as a whole for World War I is embarassing... in retrospect. Where are the specific factors? To find these, I think you have to start with the most pervading element of German society/government post-unification: disunity.
It seems natural to start with Kaiser's assertion that "Bethmann in 1914 risked war because of a mistaken belief that Germany's international position demanded it. Sharing the widespread conviction that German expansion was necessary and estimating that Germany's chances for success were diminishing, the chancellor made decisions that led directly to war." Kaiser blames Bethmann Hollweg in many ways, but who demanded war as a reinforcement for Germany's international position? The amplified foreign policy of the Weltpolitik era was a means of coordinating the uncoordinated German government- the splintered Reichstag, the chancellor, and the Kaiser. However, Weltpolitik was "a patriotic umbrella," not the reform this government really demanded. It wore off before war broke out, and was not a feasible domestic distraction by the time Bethmann came into office in 1909.
Social fracture was intense in the years leading up to and during war. There was severe polarity of town and country, problems with nationalities, and the fastest industrialization of all time occurring simultaneously. Political and social groups mushroomed ubiquitously, and vied for whatever best served their individual interests (Sammlung). Getting the Germans together would clearly take an extreme agent.
If disunity was the problem, and war was the solution, than Kaiser's blame seems founded- "war took place only because Bethmann circumvented the decision-making structure of the German governement." War was the solution for Bethmann alone? There were plenty of war-hawks in Germany, looking to assert bloody honor. The problems Germany experienced before 1914 would not be given a sweeping conclusion come conflict-time. Instead, far worse problems would emerge, and haunt the nation for years to come.
It seems natural to start with Kaiser's assertion that "Bethmann in 1914 risked war because of a mistaken belief that Germany's international position demanded it. Sharing the widespread conviction that German expansion was necessary and estimating that Germany's chances for success were diminishing, the chancellor made decisions that led directly to war." Kaiser blames Bethmann Hollweg in many ways, but who demanded war as a reinforcement for Germany's international position? The amplified foreign policy of the Weltpolitik era was a means of coordinating the uncoordinated German government- the splintered Reichstag, the chancellor, and the Kaiser. However, Weltpolitik was "a patriotic umbrella," not the reform this government really demanded. It wore off before war broke out, and was not a feasible domestic distraction by the time Bethmann came into office in 1909.
Social fracture was intense in the years leading up to and during war. There was severe polarity of town and country, problems with nationalities, and the fastest industrialization of all time occurring simultaneously. Political and social groups mushroomed ubiquitously, and vied for whatever best served their individual interests (Sammlung). Getting the Germans together would clearly take an extreme agent.
If disunity was the problem, and war was the solution, than Kaiser's blame seems founded- "war took place only because Bethmann circumvented the decision-making structure of the German governement." War was the solution for Bethmann alone? There were plenty of war-hawks in Germany, looking to assert bloody honor. The problems Germany experienced before 1914 would not be given a sweeping conclusion come conflict-time. Instead, far worse problems would emerge, and haunt the nation for years to come.
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