Beyond Historical Perspective?

Chris Lorenz's article Beyond Good and Evil? offers a variety of perspectives on the Second Reich's role in the rise of Nazism. Some historians believe in an inherent tie between the two, though they're able to conflict on the roles of Bismarck, liberalism, geopolitics, economics and culture. Nipperdey (and others, though not so discreetly) outright rejects a connection between the Second and Third Reichs, citing two different Germanies in two different periods and a social heterogeneity that makes connection irrelevant. So what's an ideal interpretation? Can these theories be reconciled to get a clear, continuous picture of Germany?

The Bielefeld school's (Wehler and Kocka's) famous theory revolves around the idea of German Sonderweg, explaining the nation's unique destiny through a combination of backwards politics and a rapidly advancing economy. Bismarck is here posited as a Bonapartist, who distracted the masses from domestic problems through foreign affairs and built national unity in the form of "negative integration." This Sonderweg would not have been possible without the failure of German liberals to parliamentarize and reform the nation. The authoritarian nature of Germany was a consistancy from Reich to Reich.

Hillgruber, Hildebrand and Sturmer contradict the Bielefeld interpretation through a geopolitcal stance, stating Germany's problem was its very existence, in that it "was too big to cohabit with Europe and too weak to control it." German military assertion (and defeat) was therefore inevitable. Though these three historians (Mittellage school) are noted as offering a discontinuity in Second and Third Reich politics, they still frame German destiny as beginning with unification, just like Bielefeld. Thus, importance is placed on Bismarck and early Prussian assertion for both.

These are reasonable ideas with pretty comprehensive explanations, but they are well-challenged (especially Bielefeld) through the neo-Marxist critique of Eley and Blackburn. These two see a fundamental fallacy in the notion that the aristocracy was inherently feudal and the bourgeoisie inherently liberal. The error is in an understanding through stigma rather than fact, and shows too much association with British and French history. This fascinates me. There are certain historical trends (political and economic trends) that people link- like democracy and capitalism- that simply do not have to co-exist. Capitalism, which did indeed flourish under fascism, was not necessarily the boon of the German bourgies. Elie and Blackburn's assertion: it is ridiculous to view the Sonderweg on the basis of what didn't happen in Germany. This resonates well with me.

A note: I don't know about the rest of the class, but reading Lorenx initially did little for me. Only after this article was broken down in class could I go back and properly interpret it. Is double-reading thus mandatory for future comprehension? I hope not, that's alot of work. Also, this blog post is less of a feedback opportunity as a review activity. If anyone gets this far, I apologize for the regurgitation. Continuing (with some closure and a more honest format)...

Mommsen: no decision was made between aristocratic authoritarianism and bourgie parliamentarism. So stability was Bismarck's job in this respect, and he failed- failed to protect the conservative power structure he espoused, a protection which would have meant more significant stability than the balancing of class forces that left Germany teetering and vulnerable. Vulnerable to what? Industry boomed and, after the initial crash, most social groups experienced a wealth influx. Vulnerable to military defeat and an ultimate Hitler?

Ritter: the ideological divisions of Germany go back as far as the 1830's, with each bloc having a social group to depend on. The liberals alone lacked a credibility and social base that rendered them hopeless after the 1873 crash. Bismarck's negative integration backfired, catalyzing a political mobilization that gave the German system distinctly modern features (take that Bielfeld).

After the storm, Nipperdey is a breath of fresh air, which is probably why Lorenz fleshes his ideas out last. In essence, history can not be regarded in the linear fashion that most historians see it in. It is rather a "sea of possibilities," an "open process"- in which "individuals can exercise a decisive influence." Individuals like Bismarck or Hitler or Kaiser Wilhelm or Gavrilo Princep...

It is not a waste of time to grapple with early structures in trying to relate to modern ones, but in doing so, historians cannot help but see the nuances. In this respect, Nipperdey's historiography has the efflugence of philosophy- an appeal of general application, not just German. So, in what could be viewed as a copout, I'll subscribe to the Nipperdey school, and not allow the vague leftisms and rightisms such lofty influence- the influence people, intentions, and accidents deserve. Through the Second German Empire, Lorenz closes, we see "how much construction lurks in every reconstruction of history." A statement as empowering as it is unsettling.